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Abstract: Building a social security system to ensure Singapore residents have peace of mind in
funding for retirement has been at the top of Singapore government’s policy agenda over the last
decade. Implementation of the Lifelong Income For the Elderly (LIFE) scheme in 2009 clearly shows
that the government spares no effort in improving its pension scheme to boost its residents’ income
after retirement. Despite the recent modifications to the LIFE scheme, Singapore residents must still
choose between two plans: the Standard and Basic plans. To enhance the flexibility of the LIFE
scheme with further streamlining of its fund management, we propose some plan modifications
such that scheme members do not face a dichotomy of plan choices. Instead, they select two age
parameters: the Payout Age and the Life-annuity Age. This paper discusses the actuarial analysis for
determining members’ payouts and bequests based on the proposed age parameters. We analyze
the net cash receipts and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for various plan-parameter configurations.
This information helps members make their plan choices. To address cost-of-living increases we
propose to extend the plan to accommodate an annual step-up of monthly payouts. By deferring
the Payout Age from 65 to 68, members can enjoy an annual increase of about 2% of the payouts for
the same first-year monthly benefits.
Keywords: inflation risk; investment returns; life annuity; longevity risk; post-retirement benefits
1. Introduction
Building a social security system to ensure Singapore residents have peace of mind in funding
for retirement has been at the top of the Singapore government’s policy agenda over the last decade.
Implementation of the Minimum Sum Scheme in 1987, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) Lifelong
Income For the Elderly (LIFE) scheme in 2009, the simplified LIFE scheme in 2013 and the recently
proposed changes to the LIFE scheme in 2016 clearly show that the government spares no effort in
improving its pension scheme to boost its residents’ income after retirement.1
Although many developed countries have valuable experience in establishing and implementing
public pension schemes, it is evident that the Singapore government desires to build a system based
on its own principles of governance and unique social structure, rather than simply adopting an
existing system. Several characteristics of the current LIFE scheme distinguish it from other public
pension systems. First, it is a defined-contribution scheme in which individuals get their benefits
based on what they have contributed. Second, the scheme is compulsory and comprehensive,
1 According to the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2016 [1], Singapore’s retirement income system is ranked the
highest among all of the Asian countries considered.
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casting a wide safety net and mitigating the self-selection problem. Third, members in the scheme
receive life-annuity payouts, which reduces longevity risk. Fourth, the scheme is managed by the
government, with low operating costs and no credit risk. Fifth, there is a guarantee of return for the
cash contributions in the form of bequests to the beneficiaries.
The many changes made since the first implementation of the LIFE scheme should be viewed
as a commitment on the part of the government to make the system responsive to the needs and
perceptions of Singapore residents. For instance, the revamp of the LIFE scheme in 2013 resulted
in reducing the number of plan choices from four to two; namely, the Standard and Basic Plans.
Although both plans provide life-annuity payouts, they differ in the amounts of monthly payouts
and bequests to the beneficiaries when the CPF member passes away.
As more Singapore residents enter retirement, their experiences and needs become better
known. This led the government to form the CPF Advisory Panel in 2014 to review the overall
social security system2. In Part I of their report issued in 2015, the Panel laid down three guiding
considerations—adequacy, flexibility and simplicity—based on which of several recommendations
were made. In adopting these recommendations, the government has made several changes to
the LIFE scheme and implemented them beginning in 2016. First, the starting age of the annuity
payouts can be selected by the CPF members, ranging from age 65 up to 70. Second, members
are given the option to increase their contributions if desired, so that they receive higher payouts
and bequests. Third, members can withdraw lump sums from their CPF accounts after reaching the
Payout Eligibility Age. Fourth, members can top up their spouses’ CPF accounts to enable them to
enjoy the benefits of the LIFE scheme.
Despite the abovementioned flexibility provided by the enhanced LIFE scheme, members must
still choose between only two plans: Standard and Basic. These two plans differ from each other in
that the Standard Plan pays higher monthly payouts but lower bequests compared to the Basic Plan3.
In this paper we propose to modify the LIFE scheme, while maintaining the key features of the two
plans. Our proposed scheme allows members to choose monthly payouts between the two existing
plans to suit their personal preference. We call our modified scheme the Unified Plan.
Under the Unified Plan, CPF members do not face a dichotomy of plan choices. Instead,
they select two age parameters: the Payout Age and the Life-annuity Age. The Payout Age is the
age at which the member starts to receive monthly payouts from the Retirement Account, and the
Life-annuity Age is the age at which the member starts to receive monthly payouts from a life-annuity
fund. Similar to a universal life insurance policy, the Unified Plan considers each installment payable
from the Retirement Account as a contribution to a notional account rather than the premium for
an insurance product.4 With this new feature, the adjustments of payouts and bequests under the
Unified Plan are streamlined.
In sum, we propose modifications of the CPF LIFE scheme to enhance its flexibility. Our proposal
of a single notional fund facilitates the risk management of the fund sponsor and administrator.
Our study also contributes to the actuarial analysis of similar nation-wide pension systems. 5
2 The CPF Advisory Panel was formed by the Ministry of Manpower to study possible changes of the LIFE scheme. Part I
of the Panel’s recommendations have been implemented from January 2016. The government has accepted Part II of the
Panel’s recommendations: escalating payouts to address increases in the cost of living and providing a new simple and
low-fee investment option.
3 The CPF Board provides the CPF LIFE Payout Estimator on its official website. Members enter their personal information
such as age, gender and Retirement Account balance to obtain estimates of their payouts and bequests under the two plans.
However, the Estimator does not allow members to input the projected contributions at age 65. The Standard Plan is the
default if a member does not make a personal choice out of the two plans.
4 A glossary of insurance terms is provided at the end of the paper.
Risks 2017, 5, 25 3 of 17
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the major features of the
proposed Unified Plan. Section 3 analyzes the cash flows under different parameter configurations
of the Unified Plan and discusses the choice of the configurations. Section 4 examines a possible
step-up payout extension of the plan, and Section 5 provides a case study under the Unified Plan
with different options. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and discusses possible extensions
of the CPF LIFE scheme.
2. The Proposed Unified Plan
Under the proposed Unified Plan, CPF members select two age parameters: the Payout Age
(PA) and the Life-annuity Age (LA). According to their choice of age parameters, members receive
different amounts of payouts and bequests, thus enhancing the flexibility of the dichotomized LIFE
scheme. To fund the monthly payouts and possible bequests, two funding sources are established:
the Retirement Account (RA) and the Lifelong Income Fund (LIF). In the current LIFE scheme,
the two installments transferred from the RA to the LIF are considered as separate premiums to
two different funds. As a result, each of these funds is used to fund part of the monthly payouts and
part of the bequest. However, under the Unified Plan, only the annuity fund LIF is considered as a
notional account directly funding the life-annuity payouts and possible bequests.6 The amount in the
notional account works as a basis for the plan administrator to determine the payouts and bequests.
Our proposal simplifies the life-annuity funding arrangement without losing any flexibility. In this
section, we outline the major features of the Unified Plan.
The framework of the Unified Plan is presented in Figure 1. Following the LIFE scheme, an RA
is created for each member at age 55, provided the member’s CPF accounts have sufficient funds.
The first installment is then transferred from the RA to the LIF. Upon reaching the Payout Eligibility
Age of 65, the member has five years to decide when the monthly payouts will start. At the time the
PA is selected, the member also selects the LA. In other words, the possible values of the PA range
from 65 to 70, whereas the LA is higher than or equal to the PA.7
If a member specifies that the LA should be the same as the PA, the balance in his RA is
completely transferred to the LIF as the second installment. After the transfer, the RA is closed and
the member receives monthly annuity payouts from the LIF for life. Upon the member’s death, if
the total amount of monthly payouts is less than the sum of the two installments to the LIF, the
difference is payable to the member’s beneficiaries as bequests. Otherwise, no bequest is payable.
Under this parameter configuration (i.e., PA = LA), the plan works as an ordinary life annuity, with
the premium refund feature as the bequest. This plan configuration is similar to the current default
Standard Plan, and is illustrated in the upper right-hand panel of Figure 1. Therefore, we suggest
using the configuration (70, 70) as the default option of the Unified Plan.
In contrast, if the member chooses an LA that is higher than the PA, the amount of the second
installment is determined actuarially. This amount is then transferred from the RA to the LIF at the
PA, and the remaining balance in the RA acts as the source of an annuity certain to fund payouts for
the period from the PA to the LA. If he dies before reaching the LA, any outstanding balance in his RA,
together with the two installments to the LIF, are paid to his beneficiaries as bequests. If he survives
5 An example of a similar nation-wide pension system is the proposal initiated by the Hong Kong government.
On 18 January 2017, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR government announced in his 2017 Policy Address that
“The Government will study the feasibility of a public annuity scheme and explore whether we can have life-annuity plans run by the
public sector, so as to help elderly persons turn their one-off assets into a stable monthly retirement income to reduce uncertainty. . . . . . ”
(see http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2017/eng/p197.html). Prior to that, Law [2] proposed a public annuity scheme similar to
Singapore CPF LIFE scheme.
6 We note that the notional account of the Unified Plan can be easily modified as an investment fund, rendering it similar to
variable products in the insurance market for which an investment option may be offered to the policy holder.
7 Adopting Part I of the CPF Advisory Panel recommendations, the government has allowed CPF members to make the
choice for both the Payout Age and the Plan (Standard or Basic) any time after the Payout Eligibility Age of 65 but before 70.
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and reaches the LA, the RA is closed and the monthly payouts are payable for life from the LIF. Upon
the death of the member after the LA, if the total amount of the monthly payouts from the LIF is less
than the sum of the two installments to the LIF, the difference is paid to the member’s beneficiaries as
a bequest. Otherwise, no bequest is payable.8 This age-parameter configuration is illustrated in the
lower right-hand panel of Figure 1. Note that this choice is similar to the current Basic Plan. Given
that the current Basic Plan has fixed 90 as the starting age for the life-annuity payments, we propose
to set the upper limit of the LA at 90, while allowing members to select lower values, such as 80 or
85, for higher payouts and lower bequests.
Given the same amount of contributions to the scheme, different configurations of PA and LA
in the Unified Plan result in different monthly payout and bequest amounts, providing additional
flexibility to meet the members’ needs. Furthermore, under the Unified Plan, only one LIF operates
for each member, unlike the current LIFE scheme, which has two annuity income funds. Thus, when
interest rate and mortality experience deviate from the actuarial assumptions, or when there is any
lump sum withdrawal from the scheme, it is straightforward to evaluate their effect on the LIF balance
and the necessary adjustments to the monthly payouts. This results in much desired simplicity for
fund management while also enhancing the flexibility of the plan options.
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Figure 1. The proposed unified plan. RA: Retirement Account; LIF: Lifelong Income Fund.
When the PA is equal to the LA, the computation of the monthly payouts is straightforward for a
given amount of total contributions to the LIF. In this case, the LIF acts as a universal life annuity with
the premium refund feature. When the PA is less than the LA, however, the monthly payouts come
from two funding sources in two different phases. To ensure that CPF members receive level payouts
(‘stable’ payouts as required by the Advisory Panel) for life, the required amounts of the installments
8 Instead of calculating the bequest as the refund of two premium contributions from two annuity funds, as in the current
scheme, the Unified Plan simplifies the determination of the amount of bequest as the unused amount in the LIF.
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to the LIF must be computed according to sound actuarial principles. The installments and monthly
payouts can be determined using the actuarial framework proposed in [3], based on the actuarial
equivalence principle. In this paper we adopt the methodology therein to evaluate the Unified Plan,
with the details of the analysis summarized in Appendix A. We determine the appropriate amount to
be transferred to the RA at age 55, as well as the level monthly payouts starting from the Payout Age.
Further analysis is summarized in Appendix B, which determines the benefits and costs provided by
the LIF at different stages of the plan under different plan parameter configurations.
3. Illustrative Plan Outcomes
In this section we present some results on comparing different plan parameter choices.
To facilitate easy comparison we use age and fund contribution figures based on CPF illustrations.
We first present the results for the monthly payouts, some of which can be compared against the CPF
illustrations. Plan parameter choices are then evaluated based on net cash flows and internal rate
of return. Finally, we further analyze the plans as compositions of different insurance products at
different stages of the payouts. These results provide additional insights into the LIFE scheme and
show the relative importance of the payouts and bequests in different plan parameter configurations.
3.1. Plan Assumptions
We now consider the assumptions of the investment return and mortality in the actuarial models.
As the CPF Board is currently crediting 4% interest for the RA savings, we assume the investment
return rate to be fixed at 4% per annum. For the mortality assumption, we first note that life tables
for the CPF members are not available. If the Singapore Complete Life Tables are used for the CPF
members, the mortality rate is likely to be overstated, as the survival rates of the CPF members are
expected to be higher than those of the general population. To construct the survival distributions of
the CPF members, we propose using the U.S. RP-2014 annuitant mortality tables as a proxy.9 With
possible mortality improvement, we also modify the RP-2014 mortality tables by incorporating the
MP-2014 mortality improvement factors.10 As the sensitivity study of applying RP-2014 and MP-2014
to our model does not show any significant differences in the analysis of the Unified Plan, MP-2014 is
used to construct the life table for the cohort age 55 in 2014 as the mortality assumption. Furthermore,
we adopt the constant force-of-mortality assumption within each year of age.11
3.2. Monthly Payouts
To evaluate the financial effects on the annuity payouts under different configurations of the
Unified Plan and varied contribution amounts, we construct a Unified Plan Estimator to calculate the
cash flows. To illustrate the plan outcomes based on the Estimator, we consider some retirement
savings cases. Following the recent CPF LIFE scheme descriptions, we consider the following
Retirement Account savings at age 55: Basic Retirement Sum (BRS) of 80 5000, Full Retirement Sum
(FRS) of 161 000 and Enhanced Retirement Sum (ERS) of 241 500.12 BRS, FRS and ERS are the amounts
of retirement sums CPF uses as illustrations of monthly payouts. In particular, ERS is the maximum
amount a CPF member is currently allowed to transfer to the Retirement Account.13 We also consider
cases in which the member makes new money contributions to the RA at age 65, such that the FRS and
ERS can be reached. Table 1 provides the monthly payouts for a male CPF member under different
9 See RP-2014 Mortality Tables Report [4] for a description of the mortality table construction methodology.
10 See Mortality Improvement Scale MP-2014 Report [5] for a description of the mortality improvement estimation methodology.
11 These assumptions are also considered in [3], which discusses other model assumptions and evaluates the sensitivity of
the results with respect to the assumptions.
12 All monetary amounts in this paper are in Singapore dollars. For simplicity, however, the dollar signs are suppressed.
It should be noted that CPF may revise the BRS, FRS and ERS amounts in future.
13 See CPF: Your Assurance in Retirement [6] for details of these examples.
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savings contribution amounts and age-parameter configurations, with the PA equaling 65 to 70 and
the LA equaling the PA, 80 and 90.
Table 1 shows the following results. First, for every one-year deferment in the PA, the monthly
payouts increase by about 6–7% for any LA choices.14 If a member defers his PA to 70, he gets about
35% more in his monthly payouts than what he receives if he opts to start the payout at age 65.
Second, for a selected PA, if a member chooses an LA of 80, he receives about 3–4% less each month
than if he chooses an LA that is the same as the PA. The drop in the monthly payouts increases to
about 10% if he chooses an LA of 90. In return, he is covered by a longer term insurance and leaves
more bequests to his beneficiaries. Third, while the total contributions to the RA for Cases C, E and F
are the same, the monthly payouts for Case C and F are about 14% (28%) more than those for Case E.
Due to the higher contributions at an earlier age for Cases C and F, compared to Case E, the former
earns more interest over a longer period, resulting in higher monthly payouts. Likewise, payouts for
Case B are about 20% more than those for Case D, although the total contributions to the RA for the
two cases are the same.
As Table 1 shows, regardless of the contributions to the RA, the maximum monthly payout is
about 50% more than the minimum over the possible PA and LA choices. In summary, the Unified
Plan provides a variety of payout possibilities to suit CPF members’ preferences.15
Table 1. Payouts of the Unified Plan for a male Central Provident Fund (CPF) member.
Retirement Savings Payout Age (PA)
RA Savings New Money Life-Annuity
Case at Age 55 at Age 65 Age (LA) 65 66 67 68 69 70
A 80 500 0 PA 649 688 729 774 823 875
80 622 661 703 748 797 849
90 582 617 655 696 740 788
B 161 000 0 PA 1298 1375 1459 1549 1645 1749
80 1245 1322 1405 1496 1593 1699
90 1164 1234 1310 1392 1480 1576
C 241 500 0 PA 1947 2063 2188 2323 2468 2624
80 1867 1983 2108 2243 2390 2548
90 1746 1852 1965 2088 2220 2364
D 80 500 80 500 PA 1085 1149 1219 1293 1373 1459
80 1040 1104 1173 1248 1328 1416
90 971 1029 1091 1158 1231 1310
E 80 500 161 000 PA 1521 1611 1708 1812 1923 2044
80 1457 1547 1643 1748 1860 1982
90 1360 1440 1527 1621 1722 1832
F 161 000 80 500 PA 1734 1837 1948 2067 2196 2334
80 1662 1765 1876 1995 2125 2265
90 1553 1646 1746 1854 1971 2098
Note: The mortality table used is MP-2014, and the interest rate assumed is 4%.
3.3. Net Cash Receipts Analysis
To assess the Unified Plan’s cash flows, we define the members’ Net Cash Receipts (NCRs) as the
sum of the aggregate monthly payouts and bequests minus the total contributions to the RA. As the
Unified Plan provides returns of the unused contributions, the NCRs are always positive. To evaluate
14 Note that this result is in line with the CPF LIFE scheme description.
15 A reviewer raises the concern of incurring adverse selection costs due to the additional options offered to the CPF members
in the Unified Plan. As discussed in Section 2, the Unified Plan has a self-adjustment mechanism for the payouts. Any
additional cost (due to mortality and return experience) is eventually transferred to the CPF members based on the actuarial
equivalence principle. As a result, CPF members bear all the risks and there is no financial impact on the government as
the plan provider. This mechanism is made easier by operating with one LIF rather than two.
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the effect that the age-parameter configuration choice has on the net cash receipts, we plot the latter
at different age-at-death values under a variety of parameter configurations and contributions in
Figure 2. To facilitate exposition, we denote a plan choice by the duplet (PA, LA). Figure 2 reveal the
following results. First, the net cash receipts in configuration (70, 70) dominate those in configuration
(65, 65). Likewise, (70, 90) dominates (65, 90). These results are perhaps not surprising, as deferring
monthly payouts enables the funds to earn more interest, giving rise to higher aggregate payments
over time. Second, (70, 70) dominates (70, 90) and (65, 65) dominates (65, 90) in terms of the net cash
receipts if the member lives to an age of approximately 90 or beyond. As configurations with PA
equaling LA provide higher payouts and lower bequests than those with a PA of less than the LA, the
net cash receipts for plans of the former configuration are lower (higher) than those of the latter if the
member dies earlier (later).
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Figure 2. Net Cash Receipts (NCR) under various parameter configurations and plan choice (PA, LA).
3.4. Internal Rate of Return Analysis
Although NCR is easy to calculate, it does not consider the time value of money. An
alternative measure of the plan outcome is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), evaluated over different
age-at-death. Figure 3 presents the IRR of four selected plan configurations under different fund
contributions, and shows the following results. First, the IRR of configuration (70, 70) is significantly
higher than that of (65, 65) if the member dies earlier (approximately age 82 or before). Otherwise,
the IRR values of the two plans are very close. This result is in line with the results from Figure 2,
and shows the advantage of deferring the monthly payouts. Second, the IRR of configuration (65, 80)
is higher than that of (65, 65) if the member dies earlier (approximately age 83 or before). Otherwise,
the IRR of configuration (65, 65) is slightly higher. When the member dies earlier, the higher bequest
for the plan (65, 80) compensates for its lower monthly payouts and leads to a higher IRR when
compared to configuration (65, 65). Third, the configuration (70, 90) has a stable IRR of slightly less
than 4% until age-at-death of around 90. Beyond this point, the IRR rises, although it is lower than
the IRR values of the other three plans. Overall, this plan configuration is the best choice under a
maximin IRR criterion of selecting the plan parameters.
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(PA, LA).
3.5. Analysis of the Lifelong Income Fund
As the plan administrator, the CPF Board shares the profit and loss of the LIFE scheme, due
to the uncertainty in mortality and investment returns, with its members through the credited
rate of interest rate declared periodically. The LIF, which is made up of the contributions from
the RA and credited interest, is subject to monthly payout deductions and life insurance coverage
costs. Thus, from an actuarial perspective, the LIF is like the notional account of a universal life
product, as the underlying assets are not segregated from the CPF’s general account. In this section,
we analyze the balance of the LIF as the premiums of life annuity and life insurance coverage at
members’ different life stages. We consider the actuarial evaluation of each component over these
stages. The mathematical details are summarized in Appendix B. This analysis clarifies the relative
importance of the insurance components in different plan parameter choices.16
We first consider the case when the LA is set to be equal to the PA. In this case, the LIFE scheme
can be divided into two stages. Stage 1 is from age 55 to the PA, and Stage 2 is from the PA onward.
The first installment made at age 55 (the beginning of Stage 1) and can be considered as the sum of
two premiums: one for purchasing a pure endowment policy that matures at the PA and the other
for purchasing a term insurance policy (for the bequest). When the member survives to the PA,
the balance of the LIF is equal to the survival benefit of the pure endowment insurance. Any new
contribution from the RA to the LIF plus the survival benefit is then used to purchase a life annuity
and a decreasing term insurance policy in Stage 2.17
To illustrate the breakdown of these components, we consider a case of a male member
with 80 500 savings in his RA at age 55 and a new contribution of 161 000 to the RA at age 65.
Among the parameter configurations of PA equal to LA, we consider three different configurations
(PA = LA = 65, 67 and 70) and analyze the LIF in these two stages. The results are summarized
in Panel A of Table 2. At age 55, the amount in the RA to be transferred to the LIF is 5190.18
If PA = LA = 65, the balance of the LIF at age 55 is 4891 for the premium of the pure endowment
insurance and 299 for the premium of the term insurance, which represent 94% and 6%, respectively,
of the first installment. If the member survives to the PA, the survival benefit of the pure endowment
insurance is 7792 and the second installment from the RA to the LIF is 272 477. The sum of the survival
benefit and the second installment is divided into the premium of a life annuity of 257 910 and the
16 The balance of the LIF represents the cash value for a surrendering policyholder. As a result, this analysis is important in
assessing the financial outcomes of the Unified Plan, should the option of plan switch or early termination be granted to
the member.
17 As the bequest is equal to the difference between the total amount of monthly payouts and the sum of the two installments
to the LIF, the amount of possible bequest is decreasing as time goes on.
18 See Appendix A for the computation of the cash flows.
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premium of a decreasing term insurance of 22 359, with the term being 15 years and 2 months. This
implies that it takes 15 years and 2 months to repay back the total amount of the two installments to
the LIF as monthly payouts. Thus, the relative weights of the premiums of the life-annuity and term
insurance are, respectively, 92% and 8%. The results for the other two configurations are similar, and
it can be seen that the term insurance components increase with the PA, but are at most 10% in all
three cases.
Table 2. An illustrative example of the premium components of the LIF.
Panel A: Cases of Payout Age (PA) equaling Life-annuity Age (LA)
PA = LA = 65 PA = LA = 67 PA = LA = 70
Premium Premium Premium
Monetary as percent Monetary as percent Monetary as percent
Stage 1: Age 55 to PA amount of LIF amount of LIF amount of LIF
First installment to LIF 5190 5190 5190
Pure endowment premium 4891 94% 4828 93% 4728 91%
Term insurance premium 299 6% 362 7% 462 9%
Stage 2: PA onward
Endowment benefit brought forward 7792 8491 9702
Second installment to LIF 272 477 294 711 331 510
Life-annuity premium 257 910 92% 276 539 91% 306 355 90%
t2-year decreasing term premium 22 359 8% 26 663 9% 34 857 10%
t2 15 212 years 15
6
12 years 14
7
12 years
Panel B: Cases of Payout Age (PA) less than Life-annuity Age (LA)
PA = 65, LA = 80 PA = 65, LA = 90 PA = 70, LA = 90
Premium Premium Premium
Monetary as percent Monetary as percent Monetary as percent
Stage 1: Age 55 to PA amount of LIF amount of LIF amount of LIF
First installment to LIF 5190 5190 5190
Pure endowment premium 4891 94% 4891 94% 4728 91%
Term insurance premium 299 6% 299 6% 462 9%
Stage 2: PA to LA
Endowment benefit brought forward 7792 7792 9702
Second installment to LIF 73 876 12 112 26 351
Pure endowment premium 68 311 84% 14 431 73% 25 239 70%
Term insurance premium 13 357 16% 5 473 27% 10 815 30%
Stage 3: LA onward
Endowment benefit brought forward 160 644 87 616 118 945
Life-annuity premium 154 865 96% 86 833 99% 116 987 98%
t2-year decreasing term premium 5779 4% 783 1% 1958 2%
t2 5 512 years 1 year 1
5
12 years
Note: This example assumes a male member with 80 500 savings in his RA at age 55 and new money of
161 000 deposited into his RA at age 65. The mortality table used is MP–2014, and the interest rate assumed
is 4%. t2 is the term of the monthly decreasing term insurance covered by LIF (see Appendix A).
For the case where the PA is less than the LA, three stages of policy separation can be considered.
Stage 1, from age 55 to the PA, is the same as Stage 1 of the case with PA = LA. Stage 2 now refers
to the period from PA to LA, in which the member receives an annuity certain from the RA. Stage 3,
which is from the LA onward, consists of a life annuity and a decreasing term insurance.
Again, we consider the case of a male member with 80 500 savings in his RA at age 55 and a
new contribution of 161 000 to the RA at age 65. The results of three different configurations in which
the PA is less than the LA are summarized in Panel B of Table 2. It can be seen that in Stage 1 (age
55 to PA) the results are the same as those in Panel A (with PA = LA). Similar to Stage 1, Stage 2
also consists of a pure endowment and a term insurance. However, the premium component of
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the term insurance policy in Stage 2 is much higher than that in Stage 1, reaching 30% for the case
of PA = 70 and LA = 90, as the cost of the term insurance is higher due to higher mortality rates
in this stage. Finally, in Stage 3, the weight of the decreasing term insurance component drops to
below 5% as the death benefit reduces rapidly. The duration of the decreasing term insurance t2 is
larger for lower LA or/and higher PA, as the amount of the second installment is higher under these
two situations. As the amount of LIF is used to fund the future benefits in terms of payouts and
bequests, the single LIF of the Unified Plan for each member provides a simple and direct mechanism
to adjust the payouts and bequests according to the balance of the LIF.
4. Plan Extension with Step-up Payouts
Currently, the LIFE scheme makes level monthly payouts throughout the life of a CPF member.
As inflation risk is a major risk for retirement funding, it may be useful to consider extending the
Unified Plan to allow for a step-up of monthly payouts. Assuming a constant step-up rate for monthly
payouts, it is straightforward to modify the method in Appendix A to evaluate the payouts based on
the principle of actuarial equivalence. To illustrate this extension, we consider Cases C and E in
Table 1, with level payouts and a payout step-up of 2% per annum.19 In Table 3, we summarize the
results of the payouts in the first year, with different PA and LA parameters. It can be seen that with a
step-up, there is a drop in the first year payout of about 20% if PA = 65, with the same LA. This drop
is reduced to about 18% if PA = 70, with the same LA. Regardless of the contribution amounts, with
a step-up of 2% in the monthly payouts, the maximum starting payout is about 57% more than the
minimum starting payout over the possible PA and LA choices. As this figure is higher than the
corresponding value of about 50% when there is no step-up, the plan extension provides an even
wider range of payout amounts for the members to choose from. By deferring the Payout Age for
three years, members can enjoy an annual increase of about 2% of the payouts versus the first-year
monthly benefits for all the considered cases.
Table 3. Payouts of the Unified Plan with a step-up feature for a male CPF member.
Retirement Savings Payout Age (PA)
RA Savings New Money Step-up Life-Annuity
Case at Age 55 at Age 65 Rate Age (LA) 65 66 67 68 69 70
C 241 500 0 0 PA 1947 2063 2188 2323 2468 2624
80 1867 1983 2108 2243 2390 2549
90 1746 1852 1965 2088 2220 2364
2% PA 1557 1659 1770 1889 2018 2157
80 1490 1593 1703 1823 1953 2094
90 1373 1466 1565 1674 1792 1920
E 80 500 161 000 0 PA 1521 1611 1708 1812 1923 2044
80 1457 1547 1643 1748 1860 1982
90 1360 1440 1527 1621 1722 1832
2% PA 1216 1295 1381 1473 1572 1679
80 1163 1242 1327 1419 1520 1629
90 1069 1140 1216 1299 1389 1487
Note: The mortality table used is MP–2014, and the interest rate assumed is 4%.
5. An Illustrative Case Study
We now consider an illustrative case discussed in the CPF booklet for a CPF male member whose
Ordinary Account, Special Account and Medisave Account balances are 100 000, 200 000 and 43 500,
respectively.20 The member is currently aged 55 and is considering several options in planning for
his retirement. He has to decide whether he should withdraw savings from his CPF accounts, the
19 This step-up payout arrangement is similar to one of the recent recommendations of the CPF Advisory Panel.
20 Refer to CPF: Your Assurance in Retirement (Singapore CPF board [6]).
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amount to withdraw, the amount to transfer to the RA and whether he should pledge his property
to make additional transfers to the RA. Furthermore, he needs to decide whether he should work
beyond age 65 and defer receiving his retirement income.
Suppose the member considers the following options: (a) transfer 80 500 to the RA now and then
161 000 at age 65 or (b) transfer 241 500 to the RA now.21 If he also has a plan to work until age 67,
he can decide to start receiving payouts at that age. Our calculations show that his monthly payouts
will range from 1527 to 1 708 for option (a) (see Case E in Table 3) and 1 965 to 2 188 for option (b)
(see Case C in Table 3), depending on his choice of LA. If he chooses a payout step-up plan with a 2%
increase per year, he will receive initial monthly payouts of 1 216 to 1 381 for option (a) (see Case E in
Table 3) and 1 565 to 1 770 for option (b) (see Case C in Table 3).
We now assume the member finally chooses option (a) and picks a PA and LA of 67 and 90,
respectively, with no payout step-up. Table 4 presents the summary of the projected cash flows and
premium components funded by the LIF, with some hypothetical death age scenarios. We note that
the member will receive a projected level monthly payout of 1527. His first and second projected
installment to the LIF are 5190 and 16 582, respectively, whereas his projected RA balance at age 67
is 277 508. Table 4 provides his projected aggregate payouts and bequests at different death ages.
The breakdown of his premium components shows that the term insurance constitutes 7% of the
total amount of the LIF in Stage 1, and this component increases to 28% of the LIF in Stage 2 and then
drops to 1% for the decreasing term insurance with a duration of 1 year and 2 months in Stage 3.
6. Summary
We propose a modified version of the Singapore CPF LIFE Scheme, called the Unified Plan,
which requires CPF members to select two age parameters: the Payout Age and the Life-annuity Age.
Depending on the plan-parameter choice, retirees receive different amounts of monthly payouts and
bequests to suit their preferences. Our proposal streamlines the funding sources for the payouts to the
member’s own RA and a pooled LIF. It is not only flexible in incorporating the recent changes in the
LIFE scheme, but also simplifies the financial arrangements of the member’s future benefits. The latter
is important in modifying the payouts in response to changes in the actual mortality experience
and investment returns. We adopt the actuarial framework in [3] to determine the payouts under
different plan parameter configurations. Relating the key features of the Unified Plan to insurance
products and explaining how the annuity fund can be managed, our analysis may be of use to
other nation-wide defined-contribution pension systems. A Unified Plan Estimator is constructed to
project the cash flows under a given set of input parameters. The Net Cash Receipts analysis and the
internal rate of return analysis provide a useful guide for the CPF members to choose the parameter
configurations to meet their needs.
Our models can be used to study possible future enhancements of the scheme. In particular,
operating with a single notional fund account facilitates easier fund and risk management. It also
opens up the possibility of transferring the fund return risk to the retirees.
21 He is allowed to transfer the maximum amount of 241 500; namely, the Enhanced Retirement Sum, to the RA at age 55.
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Table 4. Illustrative outcomes of a plan choice.
Panel A: Plan choice and monthly payout
Step-up rate 0
Payout Age 67
Life-annuity Age 90
Monthly payout 1527
Panel B: Saving contributions
RA savings at age 55 80 500
New money at age 65 161 000
Total 241 500
Panel C: installments to LIF
First installment to LIF at age 55 5190
Second installment to LIF at age 67 16 582
Total 21 772
Net
Death age RA balance Total payouts Bequest cash receipts
67 277 508 1527 299 280 59 307
70 253 720 56 505 275 492 90 497
75 207 292 148 135 229 064 135 699
80 150 806 239 764 172 578 170 842
85 82 082 331 394 103 854 193 747
90 0 423 024 20 245 201 768
Panel D: Premium components of the LIF
Premium
Monetary as percent
Stage 1: Age 55 to 67 amount of the LIF
Pure endowment premium 4 828 93%
Term insurance premium 362 7%
Stage 2: Age 67 to 90
Pure endowment premium 17 937 72%
Term insurance premium 7135 28%
Stage 3: Age 90 onward
Life-annuity premium 97 535 99%
t2-year decreasing term premium 1110 1%
t2 1 212 years
Note: The mortality table used is MP-2014, and the interest rate assumed is 4%. Net cash receipts = Total
payouts + Bequest − Saving contributions.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this paper:
BRS Basic Retirement Sum
CPF Central Provident Fund
FRS Full Retirement Sum
IRR Internal Rate of Return
LA Life-annuity Age
LIF Lifelong Income Fund
LIFE Lifelong Income for the Elderly
PA Payout Age
RA Retirement Account
Glossary of Insurance Terms
The following insurance terms are used in this paper:
Decreasing term insurance A life insurance product for which the amount of death benefit is decreasing during the term
of coverage.
Life-annuity An income annuity that makes regular payments subject to the survival of the insured.
Notional account For a universal life insurance product, the notional account is made up of the premium and
credited interest, and is subject to regular deductions due to the costs of insurance and expenses.
Premium The amount of payment that the insured needs to pay for the insurance policy.
Pure endowment A life insurance product that pays a fixed amount of survival benefit when the insured survives
to a certain date, and nothing otherwise.
Term insurance A life insurance product that pays a fixed amount of death benefit when the insured dies
within a specified period of time.
Universal life insurance A particular form of insurance product with the features of flexible premium, notional account,
flexible face value and unbundled components. It is similar to a savings account combined
with a term insurance.
Variable insurance product An insurance product for which the policy benefit is determined by the outstanding balance of
an investment fund. The insured bears the investment risk of the fund for possible higher
investment return.
Appendix A. Determination of Annuity Payouts and Bequests
We first define the following notations:22
c = Payout Age
d = Life-annuity Age
e = Number of years payouts funded by RA, i.e., e = d− c
i = Annual effective interest rate
v = Discount factor = 1/(1+i)
Bg = Bequest payable at age g
C1 = First installment from RA to LIF at age 55
C2 = Second installment from RA to LIF at Payout Age
K(12)g = Monthly curtate future lifetime random variable at age g
P∗ = Monthly payout estimate at age 55
P = Monthly payout
Rg = Balance of RA at age g
Tg = Aggregate amount of payouts from LIF up to age g
We adopt the actuarial framework in [3] to determine the monthly payouts of the Unified Plan
based on the actuarial equivalence principle. The key input variables are the return of the Life
22 Commonly used actuarial notations are not defined in this paper. Readers may refer to [7] for the details.
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Income Fund and the mortality rates. The fund return rate is specified by the government as the
plan sponsor. While various mortality tables are used in [3], we adopt the U.S. MP2014 table in this
paper. For sensitivity of the results with respect to mortality assumption, see [3].
Under the Unified Plan, the cash outflows consist of the monthly payouts P starting at the
Payout Age c until death at age g, with possible bequest Bg payable upon death. If c is less than
the Life-annuity Age d, the payouts are funded by the RA from age c to age d and then by the LIF
from age d until death. The minimum value of c is the Payout Eligibility Age (currently set to be 65),
and it cannot exceed 70. In contrast, the value of d may be from c to 90. If c = d, the annuity payouts
are entirely funded by the LIF for life and the configuration is similar to the Standard Plan.
As per the plan design, if a member dies at age g before reaching age c, the bequest Bg consists
of the balance of his RA Rg and his first installment C1 to the LIF, i.e., Bg = C1 + Rg, for 55 ≤ g < c.
If a member lives to start receiving monthly payouts and chooses c = d, a second installment C2,
which is the balance in his RA, is transferred to the LIF. Thus, his RA is depleted and the monthly
payouts are funded by the LIF. If he dies after age c, the bequest is the difference between the sum of
two installments and the aggregate amount of payouts from the LIF Tg, i.e., Bg = max[C1 +C2−Tg, 0]
for g ≥ c.
If his choice is d > c, C2 to the LIF is only part of the RA balance, as the rest is used to fund the
annuity-certain up to age d. If he dies between ages c and d, the bequest to his beneficiaries is the
sum of two installments plus the balance of RA, i.e., Bg = C1 + C2 + Rg for c ≤ g < d; otherwise,
the bequest is the difference between the summation of two installments and the aggregate amount
of payouts from the LIF. In summary, we can write the bequest Bg as
Bg =

C1 + Rg, if 55 ≤ g < c,
max
[
C1 + C2 − Tg, 0
]
, if g ≥ c,
for c = d and
Bg =

C1 + Rg, if 55 ≤ g < c,
C1 + C2 + Rg, if c ≤ g < d,
max
[
C1 + C2 − Tg, 0
]
, if g ≥ d,
for c < d.
We now determine the amount C1 to be transferred from the RA to the LIF at age 55, and the
initial estimate of the monthly payout P∗. As the age-parameter configuration is determined at age
c > 55, our strategy is to determine the value of C1 so that no transfer from the LIF to the RA is
required should other age parameters be chosen later. To this effect, we adopt the minimum value
of c and the maximum value of d for the determination of C1, i.e., c = 65 and d = 90.23 Under this
configuration, the present value of the future loss of the LIF at age 55, denoted by L1, is given by
23 With this conservative age-parameter assumption, C1 is the minimum amount of installment transferred from the RA
to the LIF under any possible age-parameter configurations chosen at age c. As a result, no matter what age-parameter
configuration is finally chosen, there is no need to transfer funds back from the LIF to the RA.
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L1 =

−C1 + C1 × vK
(12)
55 +
1
12 , if K(12)55 = 0,
1
12 , · · · , 34 1112 ,
−C1 + v35 × 12P∗ × a¨(12)
K(12)55 −34 1112e
+max[C1 − TK(12)55 , 0]× v
K(12)55 +
1
12 , if K(12)55 = 35, 35
1
12 , · · · ,
where T
K(12)55
= P∗ × (12K(12)55 − 419) for K(12)55 ≥ 35.
Let t1 be the term (in years) of the monthly decreasing term insurance benefit covered by C1 after
age 90. Invoking the equivalence principle that the actuarial present value of cash inflows equals the
actuarial present value of cash outflows, P∗, C1 and t1 can be obtained simultaneously by solving a
system of equations and inequalities, so that
P∗ =
C1 ×
(
1− A 155 :
(12)
35+t1e
)
12× 35E55 ×
[
a¨(12)90 − (I(12)A) 190 :
(12)
t1e
]
subject to 12t1P∗ < C1 < (12t1 + 1)P∗ and the annuity-certain constraint (1 + i)10(R55 − C1) =
12P∗ × a¨(12)
25e .
24
At age 65, if the member really chooses the age-parameter configuration of c = 65 and d = 90,
and no new money is contributed to the RA, the monthly payout is P = P∗. In other cases, we have
to re-calculate the monthly payouts.
If the member chooses the configurations of d = c, the RA is closed after C2 = Rc is transferred
from the RA to the LIF. The payouts are then funded by the LIF for life. Under the configuration
of d > c, the monthly payouts are funded from two sources. From ages c to d, the payouts are
paid from the RA as an annuity-certain and from age d onward they are paid from the LIF as a
life-annuity. However, the payouts have to be level throughout the two periods so that members
receive a stable monthly income. To meet this condition, C2 and P have to be determined jointly
according to actuarial principles.
Note that C1 can be regarded as the cost of purchasing two insurance products at age 55: a
(c − 55)-year term insurance with death benefit C1 and a (c − 55)-year pure endowment insurance
policy with survival benefit V1, where V1 can be determined by solving the following equation
C1 = C1 × A 155 : (12)c−55e +V1 × A 55: 1c−55e .
Thus, if the CPF member survives to age c, the balance in the LIF is actuarially equivalent to the
survival benefit V1 of a pure endowment insurance policy.
Let L2 be the present value of the future loss of the LIF at age c and t2 be the term of the monthly
decreasing term insurance covered by LIF at age d. The variable L2 is then given by:
24 Note that (1 + i)10(R55 − C1) is the projected balance in the RA at age 65 based on the balance of the RA after the first
installment transferred to the LIF at age 55.
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L2 =

−V1 − C2 + (C1 + C2)× vK
(12)
c +
1
12 , if K(12)c = 0, 112 , · · · , e− 112 ,
−V1 − C2 + vt2 × 12P× a¨(12)
K(12)c −e+ 112e
+max[C1 + C2 − TK(12)c , 0]× v
K(12)c + 112 , if K(12)c = e, e+ 112 , · · · ,
where e = d− c and T
K(12)c
= P× [12K(12)c − 12e+ 1] for K(12)c ≥ e. Based on the equivalence principle,
P, C2, and t2 can be evaluated by solving
P =
V1 + C2 − (C1 + C2)× A 1c :
(12)
e+t2e
12× eEc ×
[
a¨(12)d − (I(12)A) 1d :
(12)
t2e
]
subject to 12t2P < C1 + C2 < (12t2 + 1)P and
C2 =

Rc, if c = d,
Rc − 12P× a¨(12)ee , if c < d,
where Rc is the balance in the RA at age c, inclusive of any new money amount.
Finally, we note that if c = d, C2 is the RA balance Rc and P can be calculated directly after
solving for V1. If c < d, however, C2 and P have to be determined jointly by iteration.
Appendix B. Determination of LIF Components
As discussed in Section 2, the annuity fund LIF is a notional account directly funding the
life-annuity payouts and possible bequests, resulting in simplicity in analyzing the benefits and costs
provided by the LIF at different stages of the plan under different plan parameter configurations.
The Unified Plan can be divided into three stages. Stage 1 is from ages 55 to c, Stage 2 is from
ages c to d and Stage 3 is from age d to death. If c = d, Stages 2 and 3 are collapsed into a single stage.
As discussed in Appendix A, C1 transferred from the RA to the LIF at age 55 is the cost to cover a
term insurance and a pure endowment insurance with maturity at age c. If the member lives to age
c, the LIF balance is equivalent to the survival benefit V1 of a pure endowment insurance. Otherwise,
the bequest payable is the sum of the death benefit C1 from the LIF and the balance in the RA at the
time of death.
If c < d in Stage 2, the amount V1 + C2 at age c is used to cover the costs of two insurance
products: an e-year term insurance with death benefit C1 + C2 and an e-year pure endowment
insurance with survival benefit V2. Hence,
V1 + C2 = (C1 + C2)× A 1c : (12)ee +V2 × A c: 1ee ,
from which we can solve for V2. If the member lives to age d, the LIF balance is equivalent to the
survival benefit V2 of the pure endowment insurance. Otherwise, the amount of bequest payable is
the sum of C1 + C2 from the LIF and the balance in the RA at the time of death. From age d onward
(Stage 3), the reserve V2 at age d is used to fund two insurance products: a life-annuity with monthly
payments P and a decreasing t2-year term insurance with bequest Bg = C1 + C2 − Tg for g < t2 and
zero for g ≥ t2.
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However, if c = d the amount V1 + C2 is used to fund the life-annuity and decreasing term
insurance. In summary, we have the following result:
12P× a¨(12)d + (C1 + C2)× A 1d :
(12)
t2e − 12P× (I
(12)A) 1d :
(12)
t2e =
 V1 + C2, if d = c,V2, if d > c.
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